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PUNISHMENT AND PROCEDURE: A
DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
William T. Pizzi*
In a recent issue of this journal, Professor Michael Seidman
notes that while we have "the most elaborate and detailed constitutional protections for criminal defendants of any country in the
world," we also have "the second highest incarceration rate of
any country in the world."l From these premises, he goes on to
argue that our constitutional protections, which he views as "intended to make prosecution more difficult," have been so weakened that instead they "serve [to] make the prosecutor's job
easier. "2 He complains that "the Fourth Amendment is so riddled with exceptions and limitations that it rarely prevents the
police from pursuing any reasonable crime control tactic";J that
"judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually policing the voluntariness of confessions and regularly sanction the
sort of coercive tactics that would have led to the suppression of
evidence a half century ago";4 and that courts tolerate courtroom
performances by counsel "that make a mockery of the formal
protections [of the sixth amendment]."s
The picture that Professor Seidman draws of a barbaric system in which constitutional protections are not nearly as strong
as they ought to be if they are to protect defendants from such a
system might not seem the meat for a response. After all, his
picture of the system was tossed off with broad brush strokes in a
brief essay. But two reasons compel me to respond to Professor
Seidman's picture of the system. The first is that this picture of a
system of brutal unfairness is common in law review writing and
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I want to thank Jane Thompson, the
Faculty Service Librarian, for her assistance in this and other projects. I also wish to
thank my research assistants, Ingrid Decker and David Cripe.
1. Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 Canst.
Comm. 207, 207-08 (1995).
2. Id. at 210.
3. Id. at 209.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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is often used to justify extreme positions on legal issues. Consider, for example, an essay by Professor David Luban, entitled
Are Criminal Defenders Different?,6 in which he argued that a
more aggressive level of advocacy is justified in criminal cases
than is appropriate in civil cases because our criminal justice system is so unfair. Like Professor Seidman, Professor Luban
claimed that prosecutors "enjoy overwhelming procedural advantages"? over the defense in the American criminal justice system. Again, like Professor Seidman, he considers the American
criminal justice system to be overwhelmingly harsh in its sentencing of defendants. For Professor Luban, proof of the harshness
of the system lies in the fact that we have "the dubious distinction of having a higher percentage of our population under lock
and key than any nation in the world, including the pre-Glasnost
Soviet Union, post-Tiananmen Square China, and pre-deK.lerk
South Africa." He goes on to ask, "Is this 'political abuse'? I
believe that it is."s
My second reason for responding to Professor Seidman is
that he offers this picture of a system that is terribly unfair to
defendants at a time when broad segments of the public are angry at the system for exactly the opposite reason. Statement after statement from victims complains angrily that the criminal
justice system cares about little except the rights of defendants
and systematically ignores the interests of victims or the broader
public.9 These complaints are backed up by public opinion polls
that show that the public has little confidence in the criminal justice system1o and very low respect for lawyers in general.n In the
6. 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729 (1993).
7. Id. at 1736.
8. Id. at 1749-50.
9. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Law - VICtim Rights: Remembering the "Forgotten Person" in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 572 (1987) (citation omitted)
("My life has been permanently changed. I will never forget being raped, kidnapped, and
robbed at gunpoint. However, my sense of disillusionment with the judicial system is
many times more painful. I could not, in good faith, urge anyone to participate in this
hellish process."); Steve Baker, Justice Not Revenge: A Crime Victim's Perspective on
Capital Punishment, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 339, 340 (1992) ("Like other family members of
murder victims, I found myself excluded from the system, unable to participate in the
formal proceedings. The criminal justice equation does not include the relatives or
friends of victims.").
10. A 1993 poll aimed at gauging public confidence in selected institutions showed
that only 17% of the public had a high level of confidence in the criminal justice system.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1992 164, table
2.4 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1993). The same poll showed that 52% of the public had a high
level of confidence in the police. Id.
In 1989, in a Gallup public opinion survey, those polled were asked the following
question, "In general, do you think the courts in your area deal too harshly, or not harshly
enough with criminals?" Eighty-three percent responded "not harshly enough" to the
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wake of recent high publicity cases, one wonders if public confidence in the system might not sink to even lower levels.
Because I believe that the picture offered by Professor Seidman is inaccurate, I want to criticize that view of the system and
offer a different view, in which punishment and procedure are
synergistically related. Readers can decide which view of the system is more accurate, understanding of course that both pictures
are painted with broad strokes. But even if readers disagree with
the view of the system I will put forward, they will at least better
understand the public anger directed at the system, because my
view of the system is much closer to the views of the system offered by victims and others outside the system than it is to the
picture presented by Professor Seidman.

I. A PRELIMINARY MATTER: JUDGING A SYSTEM
BY ITS INCARCERATION RATES
Both Professors Seidman and Luban make dramatic use of
the high incarceration rate in the United States when compared
with other western countries. In 1993 the United States had an
incarceration rate of 519 citizens per 100,000.12 This is roughly
ten and a half times that of the Netherlands (49), eight times that
of Norway (62), six times that of Germany (80) and France (84),
and five and a half times that of England/Wales (93).13 But while
these statistics are sad and disturbing, are they a fair measure of
how harshly particular defendants are actually sentenced and do
they show a criminal justice system that is repressive and unjust?
The answer is no. Because these figures do not take into account
other societal factors such as the strength of the particular country's social services system, the availability of handguns, the rate
question, while only 3% thought courts were too harsh. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1991 at 203, table 2.35 (U.S. Dep't of Justice,
1992).

11. The American Bar Association was stunned when its own poll, designed to show
public attitudes toward lawyers and the legal system, found that only 40% of those polled
had a favorable opinion of lawyers. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi (The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll), A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (Sept. 1993). Lawyers remained ahead
of politicians (21 %) and stockbrokers (28%), but were way behind the poll leaders, teachers (84%), pharmacists (81 %), and police officers (79%). Id. Worse yet was that those
who had had prior experience working with lawyers had a lower opinion of lawyers than
those who had not done so. Id.
12. Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars: The International Use of Incarceration,
1992-93 at 4 (The Sentencing Project, 1994) ("The Sentencing Project 1994").
13. All of these statistics appear in the chart on cross-national incarceration rates in
The Sentencing Project 1994 at 4 (cited in note 12), with the exception of the figures for
Norway for 1993, which were obtained directly from Mr. Mauer at The Sentencing Project. Letter from Marc Mauer, Assistant Director, The Sentencing Project, to William
Pizzi (Sept. 26, 1995) (on file with William Pizzi).
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of violent crime, the extent of the country's drug problem, etc.,
these dramatic figures do not tell us nearly as much about the
criminal justice system in those countries as these figures in isolation would suggest. Ken Pease, an English criminologist who has
tried to determine the level of comparative punitiveness among
European countries, concluded that measuring a country's punitiveness according to the number of its citizens incarcerated compared to the country's total population "is liable to produce
misleading results. "14
A recent article by Professor Richard Frase comparing sentencing practices in France with those in the United States illustrates just how difficult it is to compare different countries, even
when the comparison is limited to only two countries.ls He
describes France as a country that makes "very sparing use of
custodial penalties" and as a country with a "less punitive attitude. "16 He then explains how hard it is to document statistically
the conclusion that France is less punitive than the United States
because, among other problems, crimes are categorized differently and data are often not comparable between the two countries or are simply unavailable.17 Doing the best he can with the
figures, he concludes that "it seems likely that, overall, fines and
other non-custodial sentences are used less often in the United
States than in France," and that "[i]t may also be the case that
custodial terms are, on the average, longer in the United
States. "1s These are rather tenative conclusions considering that
the incarceration rate of France is one-sixth that of the United
States.
This is not to claim that the United States does not punish
criminals more severely than many or even most other western
countries. But it is difficult to find data that would show exactly
how much more criminals are punished in the United States and
14. Ken Pease, Cross-National Imprisonment Rates, 34 Brit. J. Criminol. 116, 125
(1994).
Professor James Lynch, who has published several studies aimed at trying to determine the comparative punitiveness of different countries, warns that cross-national comparisons are difficult to do well: "The "foreign-ness" of culture, laws, and practices in
other nations makes it easy to misrepresent policies and outcomes, and thereby the relative condition of nations. This misinformation distorts rather than informs policy debates
by focusing attention on mythical problems or by overstating those that do exist." James
Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia, eds.,
Crime 11 (ICS Press, 1995).
15. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Laws & Practices in France, 7 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 275
(1995).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 275-76.
18. Id. at 277.
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whether this is true for all crime categories19 and for all regions
of the country. Like Professor Frase and other comparatists, I
believe it to be the case that defendants in the United States are
generally punished somewhat more severely than similar defendants on the continent. I am also worried that whatever disparity
exists at present may be aggravated as legislatures continue to
enact mandatory sentences (such as the "three strikes" legislation in California) and to increase sentencing ranges generally.
Thus, in this article I will assume what I believe to be true-that
defendants in the United States tend to receive sentences that
are somewhat longer than those they would receive in other
western countries and that some defendants in the United States
receive sentences that are much harsher than they would receive
in Europe (including a death penalty, which does not exist in Europe). But while not denying that we have serious problems in
our criminal justice system with the harshness of certain laws, I
do not think it is fair to our system to use raw incarceration
figures to suggest the system as a whole is barbaric or repressive,
or to suggest that all defendants receive sentences in the United
States that are terribly unfair and unjust. These comparative incarceration figures mean far less than they appear to mean. At a
time when our criminal justice system has many serious
problems, I do not think it is helpful to exaggerate the problems
that do exist.
II.

INCARCERATION RATES AND DEFENDANTS'
RIGHTS
Professor Seidman presents the picture of a system in which
constitutional protections have not done the job of protecting
suspects, and as evidence of this, he points to our startling incarceration rate. He thinks prosecutors have an easy time of it in
the United States, with most of our protections watered down
and full of exceptions. This logic would certainly suggest that if
we look to European countries with low rates of incarceration we
would see criminal justice systems that make the prosecutor's job
19. One study, using cross-national data from the 1980's comparing the United
States to England and what was then West Germany, concluded that prison use in the
United States was not radically different from these other countries as far as crimes of
serious violence were concerned, but the propensity to incarcerate and the amount of
time served was greater in the United States than in the other nations for property and
drug offenses. See Lynch, Crime in International Perspective at 34-38 (cited in note 14}.
This suggests that perhaps the United States is more harsh in its sentencing practices for
some crimes but not for others. But the data for this study seem a bit dated given the
rapid changes in sentencing laws over the last several years, and thus it is hard to know if
the study's conclusions are valid today.
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much more difficult and protections for defendants that dwarf
those that exist in the United States.
But when you look at those systems, the relationship that
Professor Seidman assumes exists between incarceration rates
and protections for defendants doesn't hold at all. Consider, for
example, the Netherlands, a country with an incarceration rate
that is the lowest in Europe2o and with a reputation for tolerance21 and a tradition that has favored lenient sentencing policies.22 It is also a country that is well-known for its bold attempts
to explore alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders, such
as de facto legalization of soft drugs and novel measures to make
sure addicts stay in treatment, for example, the "methadone bus"
which brings methadone to the addict.23
But when one looks at the Dutch system of criminal procedure, one sees a system with many features that would be violative of all sorts of constitutional rights in the United States. For
example, the level of lay participation in the decision-making
process is easily stated: it is zero.24 There is no right to a jury or
even to lay judges as you find elsewhere in Europe. Moreover,
the trial places considerable emphasis on the materials gathered
during the closed pretrial stage by the police and the investigating judge. Trials tend to center on a discussion of the materials
contained in the dossier and place less emphasis on oral testimony and the examination of witnesses in open court.2s Because

20. See The Sentencing Project 1994 at 4 (cited in note 12).
21. See Constantijn Kelk, Criminal Justice in the Netherlands in Phil Fennell et al.,
eds., Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, 1995) ("Criminal Justice in Europe").
22. See Josine Junger-Tas, Sentencing in the Netherlands: Context and Policy, 7 Fed.
Sent. Rptr. 293 (1995); J.F. Nijboer, The Requirement of a Fair Process and the Law of
Evidence in Dutch Criminal Proceedings in J.F. Nijboer, C.R. Callen and N. Kwak, eds.,
Forensic Expertise and the Law of Evidence 161 (Royal Netherlands Acad. of Arts and
Sciences, 1993); Constantijn Kelk, Laurence Koffman and Jos Silvis, Sentencing Practice,
Policy, and Discretion in Criminal Justice in Europe at 319 (cited in note 21); L.H.C.
Hulsman and J.F. Nijboer, Criminal Justice System in Jeroen Chorus et al., eds., Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers 309 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 2d ed.
1993).
23. See generally Jos Silvis and Katherince S. Williams, Managing the Drug Problem: Tolerance or Prohibition in Criminal Justice in Europe at 149, 157 (cited in note 21).
24. See Nijboer, Dutch Criminal Proceedings at 164 (cited in note 22); Nico J5rg,
Stewart Field and Chrisje Brants, Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?
in Criminal Justice in Europe at 41, 50 (cited in note 21).
25. See Nijboer, Dutch Criminal Proceedings at 166 (cited in note 22); JOrg et al.,
Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging? in Criminal Justice in Europe at
50-52 (cited in note 21 ).

1996]

PUNISHMENT AND PROCEDURE

61

Dutch trials do not bar hearsay, there are cases in which the conviction is supported by statements from anonymous witnesses.z6
The Netherlands is unusual among European countries because it remains so heavily inquisitorial at a time when most
other European countries have moved away from such a heavy
emphasis on the investigatory phase of the procedure. But even
compared to other continental countries, the notion that the
American criminal justice system makes it too easy to convict
defendants, leading to a high incarceration rate, seems ridiculous.
Consider two other examples, Norway and Germany, both with
incarceration rates much lower than that of the United States. In
Norway, as is traditional in civil law systems, the judges always
ask the defendant, after the state's attorney has read the charges,
if he wishes to respond to the charges. The defendant need not
respond-he has the right to remain silent-but in such an event
the Norwegian code provides: "If the person charged refuses to
answer, or states that he reserves his answer, the president of the
court may inform him that this may be considered to tell against
him."27 Adding additional pressure to respond to the charges is
another feature of civil law trials: trials on the continent have the
dual function of determining sentence as well as guilt. Both issues are resolved at the conclusion of the trial and announced in
the court's judgment. The dual nature of the inquiry means that
the defendant will not have the chance to speak prior to sentencing in the event of a conviction as would be the case in the
United States. Thus, the fact that the trial has a dual function as
well as that the factfinders are seeking the defendant's response
means that defendants almost always choose to respond to the
charges and answer the judges' questions. This means that the
defendant is usually an important source of evidence at civil law
trials. The fact that sentence is a possible trial issue has another
advantage for the state's attorney: the defendant's criminal record is directly relevant to the issue of the appropriate sentence
26. In Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. a. H.R. (Ser. A) at 6 (1989}, the
European Court of Human Rights condemned the Netherlands for having violated Article 6(3}(d} of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees a citizen the
right to examine witnesses against him. Kostovski had been found guilty of robbery solely
on the basis of the statements of anonymous witnesses. What this decision means for civil
law countries, in which much less emphasis is placed on the interrogation of witnesses
because the trial is seen as an official inquiry rather than a contest between opposing
parties, is uncertain. See Bert Swart and James Young, The European Convention on
Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in Criminal Justice in Europe at 57, 71-72 (cited in note 21).
27. The Criminal Procedure Act of Norway, Ch. 9, § 93 (1991) (unofficial English
translation).
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and so will always be brought out, whether the defendant
chooses to respond to the charges or not.
Germany, like other civil law countries, accords victims of
serious crimes (or the family of the victim in the case of homicide) far greater rights at trial than is the case in the United
States. In Germany, victims of very serious crimes, such as homicide or rape, have the right to participate in the trial as a "secondary accuser" which gives the victim a status nearly equal to that
of the defense during pretrial proceedings and at trial.2s There is
even the possibility of appointed counsel if the victim is indigent.29 Because the defendant responds first to the charges, this
means that in a rape case, for example, the defendant will give
his account of the events before the victim has been called as a
witness, the reverse of what it would be in the United States. As
for removing the victim as part of a sequestration order when the
defendant gives his account of the events, that would not be possible in Germany if the victim has chosen to participate at the
trial because such a victim is treated like the defendant as far as
presence in the courtroom is concerned and is entitled to remain
in the front of the courtroom throughout the trial just like the
defendant. Like the state's attorney or the defense attorney, the
victim's attorney can ask questions of witnesses, suggest additional witnesses and even make a closing statement on behalf of
the victim at the end of the trial.
These are hurried glimpses of other systems. But even these
glimpses suggest that something is badly amiss in the mindset
that sees our constitutional protections as eroded to the point
that the prosecutor has an easy time of it. On a comparative basis, civil law countries with much lower incarceration rates grant
defendants far fewer protections than defendants receive in
American courts.
The same relationship exists when we move from civil law
systems to common law systems: common law systems with much
lower incarceration rates have far more limited protections than
defendants would receive in the United States. In England, for
example, the difference for defendants is apparent even in the
position of the defendant in the courtroom. During the trial, except if he takes the stand, the defendant must remain in the dock,
28. See Strafprozeordnung (StPO) § 395. On the treatment of crime victims in German courtrooms in general as well as the procedure which permits a crime victim in certain cases to participate as a secondary accuser or nebenklliger, see generally William T.
Pizzi and Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 Stan. J. Int. L. - (1996) (forthcoming).
29. See StPO §§ 406g (1) and (2), 406e.
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a small box at the very back of the courtroom where he sits, usually next to a bailiff, far removed from his barrister. There is in
England, as in the United States, the right to self-representation,
but unlike the United States, the defendant cannot participate
from the well of the courtroom as if he were a member of the
English bar. He must represent himself from the dock. The right
to self-representation is also more limited than it is in the United
States. In Colorado, there has been considerable difficulty in
sexual assault cases with defendants choosing to represent themselves, thereby forcing victims to endure cross-examination, at
rather close range, from the offender.Jo In one very serious case
involving sexual abuse of children, the defendant personally
cross-examined three of the victims, ages 10, 11, and 14.31 The
latter problem will not occur in England as the right of a defendant to personally cross-examine child victims in sexual assault
cases has been statutorily abolished.32
Professor Seidman complains that our fourth amendment is
"riddled with exceptions and limitations." But I doubt that there
is any common law country that would suppress the evidence in
cases such as Gates or Leon, two of the cases complained about
by Professor Seidman, where the officers were acting in good
faith and had judicial approval based on a warrant for searches
that resulted in the seizure of substantial amounts of drugs. In
England, the courts have traditionally not seen it as their function to discipline police officers, believing that to be a function of
the executive branch, not the judiciary.JJ This has been changed
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984. But that
act permits courts to exclude prosecution evidence only if the admission of such evidence "would have such an adverse effect on
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit
30. In 1988, Quintin Wortham was charged with a series of six rapes in Denver and
chose to represent himself. In the middle of the trial, the judge tried to order standby
counsel to take over the case because the defendant refused to obey court rulings.
Standby counsel refused, arguing that she would need weeks of preparation and a mistrial
resulted. See Howard Pankratz, Wortham Rape Trial Called a Disaster, Denver Post 1A
(Jan. 24, 1988); Howard Pankratz, Mistrial Stalls Wortham Case After 20 Days, Denver
Post 1A (Jan. 27, 1988). At his second trial, Wortham again represented himself, and he
was convicted. See Howard Pankratz, 376- Year Term Reimposed for 'Capitol Hill Rapist,'
Denver Post B4 (Apr. 9, 1994).
31. See George Lane, Dunann Convicted on All Sex Counts, Denver Post 1A (Jan.
29, 1993); Ginny McKibben, Boy Battles Fear, Tells of Forced Sex, Denver Post 1A (Jan.
23, 1993).
32. See Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Eng.) § 34A.
33. See Michael Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at 198-200
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990).
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it. "34 Canada appears to take a somewhat similar stance, requiring suppression of evidence under Section 24 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms "if it is established that, having regard to all
the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute."3s Under
either standard, it is doubtful in the extreme that suppression of
important evidence would be likely in any situation where an officer was acting in a reasonable, good faith belief in the lawfulness of his action.
Professor Seidman also complains that while "the Supreme
Court continues to insist on the ritualistic reading of Miranda
warnings, judges have virtually gone out of the business of actually policing the voluntariness of confessions and regularly sanction the sort of coercive tactics that would have led to the
suppression of evidence a half century ago."36 I don't know if
this accusation is true-Professor Seidman cites no studies-but
certainly the rights a suspect has in the United States under Miranda and its progeny to halt all questioning are far stronger than
they would be for such a suspect in England. Suspects in England have the right to refuse to answer, but at the same time, it is
understood that the police have the right to question. Thus,
when a suspect refuses to answer a question, the police will often
proceed to the next question. And while there is the right to
representation during ·interrogation, it is not seen as the function
of the defense solicitor to bar all interrogation, but rather to
make sure that the questioning is fair and that the suspect is
treated properly.37 Should a suspect refuse to answer questions,
it will be reported at trial by the interrogating officer that the

34. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Eng.) § 78(1).
35. Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Can.) Section 24(2), reprinted in Gerald-A.
Beaudoin and Ed Ratushy, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 926-34
(Carswell, 2d. ed. 1989).
36. Seidman, 12 Const. Comm. at 209 (cited in note 1).
37. A booklet published by the governing body for solicitors, the Law Society, entitled The Law Society's Guidelines: Advising a Suspect in the Police Station (3rd ed. 1991),
offers guidelines that make it clear that the solicitor is not present to prevent the interview but to see "that the interview is being and will be conducted fairly." See David
Roberts, (1) Questioning the Suspect: the Solicitor's Role, 1993 Crim. L. Rev. 368, 368
(discussing the role of the solicitor in the interrogation room and in light of the Law
Society's guidelines). The guidelines state specifically, "the officer should be allowed to
conduct an interview in his/her own way provided that he/she does so properly and
fairly." I d. See also Ed Cape, Police Interrogation and Interruption, 144 New. L.J. 120
(1994) (discussing the sort of questions that ought to prompt a solicitor to intervene on
behalf of the client).
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defendant was "cautioned" following his arrest and said
nothing.3s
Given the acceptance of a system in which the police have a
right to ask questions of a suspect as well as a system in which the
refusal to answer questions is often introduced at trial, it is not
surprising that a substantially greater percentage of suspects in
England make damaging statements to the police compared to
the United States.39 The percentage of suspects who refuse to
answer questions in the interrogation room is likely to shrink in
the future because the right to silence has been drastically narrowed under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of
1994.40 To mention just one change, section 34 of the act permits
a negative inference to be drawn at trial from the failure of a
suspect to mention any fact to the police at the time of questioning that the suspect could have mentioned at that time and which
the suspect now relies on at trial.41
The privilege against self-incrimination also provides protections for defendants in American courtrooms that have no
equivalent in courtrooms in England (or most other common law
countries). In Brooks v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court struck
down a Tennessee statute that required the defendant to testify
as the first witness on the defense case if the defendant chose to
testify. The Court ruled that this statute violated the privilege
against self-incrimination as well as due process, because the defendant must have complete freedom to testify whenever he
38. For some time, the issue of whether comment should be pennitted on the defendant's refusal to answer questions in the interrogation room has been uncertain and
viewed as unsatisfactory. See generally A.A.S. Zuckennan, The Principles of Criminal
Evidence 328-32 (Clarendon Press, 1989). In Alladice, f!J7 Crim. App. 380 (1988) (Eng.
C.A.), the Court of Appeals argued that since section 58 of the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gave a suspect the right to legal advice at the station house, it was time to
broaden the right to comment at trial on the suspect's silence in order to maintain a
proper balance between the prosecution and the defense. With the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, that call for a broader right of comment on the
suspect's silence has been answered and certain inferences adverse to the defense are
permitted at trial where the suspect has refused to answer certain questions in the interrogation room. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
39. See Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 Hast. L.J. 1, 128 (1986).
Research conducted for the latest Royal Commission on Criminal Justice showed
that the exercise of the right to remain silent was not a frequent event: only six to ten
percent of suspects outside London and between fourteen and sixteen percent of suspects
within London exercised the right to silence. See Ian Dennis, The Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act of 1994: The Evidence Provisions, 1995 Crim. L. Rev. 4, 12 n.52 (citing
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, Ch. 4, para. 15).
40. See generally Martin Wasik and Richard D. Taylor, Criminal Justice & Public
Order Act 1994 §§ 3.6-3.18 (Blackstone Press, 1995).
41. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 § 34 (Eng.).
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chooses during the defense case.42 In England, the defendant has
no right to decide when he will testify at trial. It remains the
practice in England that the defendant must be the first witness
for the defense if the defendant chooses to testify.4J
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE PICTURE OF Tiffi AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Professor Seidman sees the American criminal justice system as a harsh system, and he places the blame largely on the
failure of our system of constitutional protections, which in his
view do not make the prosecutor's job sufficiently difficult. I
have accepted his premise to the extent of agreeing that the
American criminal justice system punishes defendants more severely than other Western countries, but the evidence on this issue is not as clear as Professor Seidman suggests. I have strongly
disagreed with his view that our constitutional protections make
it too easy for prosecutors to convict the guilty, and I think the
case is fairly overwhelming that defendants have more rights and
far stronger rights than defendants in other western countries.
Professor Seidman seems frustrated and angry that our
country would develop an elaborate system of constitutional
rights that has no equivalent in other countries and, at the same
time, punish defendants more severely than other countries,
sometimes much more severely. But I think that it is not surprising to find extremes in procedure and punishment linked in this
way because there is a synergy between procedure and punishment such that extremes in one encourage extremes in the other
and vice versa. It is thus not an accident that a country with a
system of criminal procedure that is the most complicated and
the most expensive in the western world and, if the truth be
known, a trial system that is not very reliable, would also tum out
to have a system that threatens, and sometimes inflicts, punishments that are harsh compared to those in other countries. Such
42.

43.

406

u.s. 605, 611-13 (1972}.

Section 79 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 provides:
If at the trial of any person for an offence (a) the defence intends to call two or more witnesses to the facts of the case;
and
(b) those witnesses include the accused, the accused shall be called before
the other witness or witnesses unless the court in its discretion otherwise
directs.
This is interpreted to permit the defense to call a formal or noncontroversial witness prior
to the defendant, but other than such an exception, the defendant must testify first among
any fact witnesses. See P.J. Richardson, ed., 1 Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and
Practice 1995 § 4-318 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).

1996]

PUNISHMENT AND PROCEDURE

67

a system needs to put pressure on defendants by threatening
them with harsh punishments if they insist on trial, so that high
mandatory minimums, habitual offender statutes, tough sentencing guidelines, and the like are encouraged by such a procedural
system. Essentially, the system needs to work around its own
procedures, and in the United States this is done by accepting
types of charge bargains and sentence bargains-even bargains
from defendants who insist that they are innocent44-that would
not be accepted in other systems.4s
Harsh punishments in tum encourage even more emphasis
on procedure. Certainly, there is no better example than the
death penalty, where even a single mistake in jury selection by a
trial judge invalidates the death sentence no matter how heinous
the crimes committed by the offender or how many such crimes
he may have committed in the past.46 The system's reluctance to
use the death penalty translates into a requirement of technical
perfection in capital cases that can rarely be met. This in tum
feeds anger at the system47 and the main outlet for that sort of
anger is to pressure legislatures for ever harsher punishments for
criminals.48
To understand more clearly the synergy between procedure
and punishment and why the two would tend to extremes together, imagine a fictional country that has a criminal justice system that leans heavily toward rehabilitation in its sentencing
44. I question whether there is any country other than the United States that would
permit a defendant to be sentenced to prison based on a plea in which the defendant
insists that he is innocent of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. Such pleas are
permitted by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
45. England, for example, permits plea bargaining but not negotiated sentences.
SeeR. v. Turner (F.R.) (1970]2 Q.B. 321, 54 Crim. App. 352 (guidelines for plea bargaining). See generally Richardson, 1 Archbold §§ 4-51 to 4-54 (cited in note 43).
46. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (reversing judgment because trial
court excluded a qualified juror).
47. In my own state, Colorado, one of the harshest critics of our state supreme court
and its decisions in the areas of search and seizure and confessions as well as decisions on
the death penalty has been Richard Lamm, a former democratic governor, who had appointed most of the justices. In 1985, he lashed out at the court for a series of decisions
that he felt were too protective of criminals' rights and that had the result of "releasing
dangerous people back to the streets." See Marjie Lundstrom and Cindy Parmenter,
State's High Court Catches Heavy Fire, Denver Post 1A (Sept. 15, 1985). More recently,
he has attacked the court on its death penalty decisions. See Richard Lamm, Judiciary
Has Sabotaged the State's Death Penalty, Denver Post F-1 (Mar. 13, 1994).
48. An essay by Steve Baker, a police detective whose son was among those killed
by Robert Alton Harris, is an example of the way anger at the system leads to calls for
harsher penalties. In the essay, Baker describes his experiences as the father of a crime
victim and concludes, "(t]he criminal justice equation does not include the relatives or
friends of victims." Baker, 40 UCLA L. Rev. at 340 (cited in note 9). At the end of the
essay, he urges "those who sit in judgment" to remember the victims and "the rights of
the innocent." Id. at 343.
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policy and thus takes a strongly individualized approach to sentencing. The system understands that social and personal
problems can lead to crime, so that a judge in sentencing can call
upon a large number of well-trained social service people who
will work hard with the offender to try to help solve problems the
offender may have if that appears the best route to rehabilitation.
Because the country strongly believes in rehabilitation, there are
no sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimums because they
would restrict the ability of judges to treat offenders as individuals. While there are maximum sentences for each criminal offense, there are no minimum sentences for any crime, even for
murder. Custodial sentences are sometimes imposed but they
are considered the last resort, and when custodial sentences are
imposed they tend to be short. Plea bargaining of the type that
permits the prosecutor and the defense attorney to negotiate or
compromise a sentence is not allowed.49
Presumably, this is the sort of sentencing system that Professor Seidman would applaud. But it would be very unlikely that
our present system of criminal procedure would ever mesh very
well with a sentencing system that was so strongly committed to
rehabilitation and to treating offenders as individuals. For example, how could a system that had this outlook on offenders ever
embrace a tough exclusionary rule? In the first place, a tough
exclusionary rule would undercut the goal of rehabilitation in
many cases. If the defendant has a problem, the system needs to
be able to act on the problem before things get more serious and
the defendant gets into more trouble. It also is inconsistent with
the way the system is committed to understanding the behavior
of individuals. For a judge to say to a police officer, "We don't
care what your reasons were for the search, what pressures you
were under at the time, or what precautions you took to assure
the constitutionality of your actions, if it turns out there was no
probable cause, no matter how reasonable the mistake, the evidence will be suppressed," but then expect the same judge in sentencing to treat the defendant as an individual by making an
effort to learn what led this defendant into crime, is to suggest
that human conduct should be judged by two different standards.
49. The fictional country I have described has features in common with the Netherlands, though perhaps it is more the Netherlands of ten years ago as the Netherlands, like
all western countries, seems under more and more pressure to adopt policies that are
more punitive and retributive in nature. See Kelk et al., Sentencing Practice at 319-32
(cited in note 22); Peter J.P. Tak, Sentencing in the Netherlands: Discretion and Disparity,
7 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 300 (1995); Hulsman and Nijboer, Justice System at 356-58 (cited in
note 22).
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And wouldn't the American notion that constitutional rights
are there to be asserted aggressively by lawyers on behalf of their
clients have to yield in such a system? Would lawyers in such a
system see it as important, as do American defense lawyers, to
instruct their clients at the station house categorically not to talk
to the police and not to waive any right or consent to anything?so
And isn't it unlikely in the extreme that defense lawyers in such a
system would see themselves, as it has been claimed American
public defenders do, as "Robin Hood" figures "who do[] not always have to conform to the moral rules society reserves for
others"st and who take pride in "stealing" cases from the
prosecution ?s2
In short, if we were to move to a sentencing philosophy that
mirrors that of this fictional country and were to reform our sentencing laws in conformity to that philosophy, I don't see how
that sentencing system could survive without de-emphasizing our
present emphasis on defendants' rights and without major
changes in the responsibility that lawyers have to the system.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have taken strong issue with the claim that
our system of constitutional protections are not nearly strong
enough and that evidence of this is our high incarceration rate
compared to other countries. I have tried to show that those who
think our constitutional protections are riddled with exceptions
or have been watered down by this or that decision of the Court
have no perspective on our system. Compared to criminal justice
systems in other countries, defendants in the United States have
many procedural advantages that make the prosecutor's job
more difficult. Among comparatists who have compared the
American criminal justice system to other systems, it is not uncommon to conclude that if one is really guilty, one would prefer
to be tried in the United States.s3
But there is a downside to going to trial in the United States:
the risks at sentencing if found guilty. Not many offenders
choose to go to trial in the United States because few can afford
to run the risk of being sentenced if they are found guilty. I have
50. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, 1 Trial ManualS for the Defense of Criminal Cases
§ 37-A at 44 (American Law Institute, 1988).

51. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1275 (1993).
52. ld. at 1276.
53. See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 132 (Stanford U. Press, 1985).
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suggested that this is part of the synergy between procedure and
punishment and it ought not to surprise us that a country might
tend to the extremes in both its procedures and its punishments.
Like many readers, I am sure, I would like to see our sentencing laws substantially reduced and prisons improved for
those who must be incarcerated. Perhaps this is an impossible
goal and other western countries will tend to become more punitive like the United States as their crime rates rise and public
apprehension about crime grows. But however unlikely reform
of our sentencing laws may be, it becomes much more unlikely if
we move in the direction Professor Seidman would like to see us
go and substantially increase the rights that defendants have in
our system.

